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African Refugees in the Southern Mediterranean 




I. How Many African Refugees Are Arriving in South 
European Mediterranean Countries? 
 
Between 1960 and 2000, most Africans travelling across the 
Mediterranean were North Africans by origin, that is, Algerian, 
Tunisian and Moroccan, moving first to France, and subsequently 
to Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, responding to 
European demand for low skilled and low paid labour. Legal 
Moroccan emigration between the 1960s and the 2000s had 
created a diaspora of 2.6 million former Moroccans in Europe. 
Meanwhile, 700,000 Tunisians were living in France in 2003 
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2006, p. 312).   
 
From the mid-1990s, northward migration flows across the 
Mediterranean began to include significant numbers of sub-
Saharan and North-Eastern Africans seeking to claim asylum 
status in European countries, and travelling to Europe across the 
Straits of Gibraltar via Tangier in Morocco or the Spanish enclave 
territories in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla. In 2003, Morocco and 
Tunisia in response to European pressure and inducements 
tightened their own immigration laws and the Spanish enclaves 
fortified their frontiers with electrified fences that 11,000 people 
tried to climb in 2005. Spanish interceptions at sea of illegal 
migrants crossing the Mediterranean peaked at 19,716 in 2003 
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2007, p. 317). With joint Spanish Moroccan 
naval patrols and improved radar surveillance across the Straits, 
African refugee traffic across the Mediterranean shifted eastwards. 
Increasing numbers of trans-Saharan migrants began trying to 
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cross from Libya into Italian territory. In 2002, 1,686 “irregular” 
migrants arrived in Malta, a thirty-fold increase from the previous 
year (Mainwaring, 2012, p. 687). In addition, there was an 
expansion of direct sailings from West African countries through 
the Mediterranean to Sardinia, to Greece and much more 
occasionally, Cyprus. A more recent trend has been a shift 
westwards for West African migrants attempting to reach Europe, 
away from the Mediterranean altogether. Here migrants intending 
to reach the Canary Islands sometimes use Cape Verde as a transit 
point. Because of Economic Community of West African 
Countries (ECOWAS) membership, West Africans could enter 
Cape Verde, until recently, quite freely (Marcelino and Farahi, 
2011, pp. 887-888). 
 
Cross-Mediterranean refugee flows from Africa have expanded 
through the last two decades despite the closure of borders and the 
institution of fresh controls. Most of the refugees who enter 
Europe through Malta or Lampedusa (between Sicily and Tunisia) 
depart from Libya. Though the Libyans and the Italians began to 
cooperate in efforts to halt illegal migration to Sicily from Libya 
in 2004 the numbers of asylum claimers arriving on Italian islands 
and Malta or being rescued by Italian or Maltese naval patrols 
continued to increase. It was only when satellite based monitoring 
of the Libyan shoreline was introduced in 2010 and the Italians 
started paying for Libyan naval patrols that the boat traffic to 
Malta dropped (Mainwaring, 2012, p. 689). However, subsequent 
conflict and regime change in Libya disrupted this new control 
system and 15, 000 made landfalls in Malta (1,800) or Lampedusa 
(13,200) in 2012.   
 
Before the civil war, about a million sub-Saharan Africans 
lived in Libya, a consequence of the Qadhafi administration’s 
encouragement of African immigration during the 1990s. Most of 
the people who travelled from West Africa to Libya in the 1990s 
and 2000s journeyed there to find work – mainly in low skilled 
occupations, as construction workers and domestic servants for 
example. They did not travel to Libya with Europe as an intended 
final destination. After the fall of Qadhafi’s government a majority 
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of these migrants returned home southwards, but smaller groups 
paid fishermen or purchased small boats to set sail for Southern 
Italy. Through the 2000s the size of vessels used by these 
travellers became steadily smaller to evade radar detection and 
they often sailed unaccompanied by experienced seamen – the 
boats were purchased and piloted by the asylum seekers 
themselves (Klepp, 2011, p. 543). By mid 2012, press reports 
suggest that 35,000 had arrived to claim asylum in Lampedusa 
since the beginning of the year. By 2013, Malta’s population of 
refugees or asylum seekers totalled 8,248, according to UNCHRR 
statistics; for a small country, a very large population of forced 
immigrants. Most of these are people who were rescued by the 
Maltese navy from unseaworthy vessels in distress (Klepp, 2011, 
p. 551). In addition to this population, another 3,308 have been 
forcibly repatriated to their countries of origin (Mainwaring, 2012, 
p. 691). Overall, these numbers are small in absolute terms 
compared to asylum applications in the major EU states but as a 
proportion of the Maltese national population, they are very high 
indeed.  
 
Malta has a very large search and rescue zone, extending from 
Tunisia to Crete. This helps to explain why as many illegal 
voyagers as do, end up in Malta as asylum seekers, despite the 
island’s reputation among African would-be refugees as offering 
relatively poor conditions for asylum seekers. Onward migration 
from Malta is blocked by the provisions of the 2003 Dublin II 
regulations for refugee determination. Thus, the island’s policy of 
initially detaining asylum seekers and the lack of subsequent 
employment prospects, in a very restricted local labour market, 
make it likely that most of the asylum seekers who arrive were 
probably intending to reach Italy rather than Malta (Gerard and 
Pickering, 2012, p. 517-524; Mainwaring, 2012, p. 693). 
Significant numbers of refugees who leave Malta illegally to try to 
find livelihoods elsewhere in the European Union are returned to 
Malta every year under the provisions of Dublin II. As countries in 
the northern parts of the EU have been experiencing smaller 
numbers of asylum seekers, applications for asylum in countries 
that are closest to North African have been rising. 
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II. Who Are These Migrants? Where Do They Come From? 
 
The largest numbers of African refugees who at present try to 
reach European territories cross the Mediterranean from Libya as a 
transit point and are interceded by Italian or Maltese authorities. 
Asylum seekers and other kinds of “irregular migrants” who try to 
enter Spain across the Straits of Gibraltar today represent a smaller 
group. Africans who seek entry through Greece or Cyprus are 
much more exceptional and often originate from Eritrea, travelling 
overland through Egypt, Israel and Turkey. Athens has a historic 
Eritrean Coptic community, which may initially have helped to 
prompt identification of Greece as a final destination for Eritrean 
refugees. More recently, though, West Africans have been trying 
to enter Greece by sea, after crossing the Sahara and travelling to 
Egypt (Bouteillet-Paquet, 2011, p. 27). 
 
The Malta and Lampedusa asylum-seeking populations are 
mainly of North East African nationalities. In 2005, UN figures 
indicate that the main nationalities of asylum seekers and refugees 
were firstly Somalians, followed by Eritreans with the third largest 
national contingent from Sudan. The Somalians and Sudanese 
were the earliest to arrive, from 1996 onwards. The first Eritrean 
arrivals reached Malta in 2002. In the Italian islands, Eritreans, 
Ethiopians and Sudanese have predominated among asylum 
seekers. These groups have continued to represent the larger share 
of asylum seekers in both countries. For example, in 2008 half the 
asylum seekers accepted by Malta originated from Somalia. In 
Malta in 2013, in the first six months, UN statistics show that 
Somalians and Eritreans were the most common fresh arrivals 
with smaller numbers first travelling from Mali and Gambia. In 
Lampedusa in 2013, according to the Italian authorities, the largest 
African contingent of refugees arriving by boat were Eritreans 
(8,843) followed by 3,140 Somalians, and 1,058 Malians. The 
single largest group of arrivals by sea were 9,805 refugees from 
Syria, though (Frenzen, 18 Oct 2013).    
 
West Africans tend to prevail among the migrants, accepted as 
asylum seekers by the Spanish authorities in Ceuta and Melilla. 
 112
Twenty three per cent of the Spanish detainees in 2005 were from 
Mali with most of the other sub-Saharan Africans travelling from 
a wide range of other West African countries (Baldwin-Edwards, 
2007, p. 317). Ivorians began arriving in Lampedusa in significant 
numbers in 2003. 
 
It is likely that many of the West African migrants when 
leaving their home countries did not originally intend to seek 
refuge or livelihoods in Europe. Libya’s opening of its labour 
markets to West Africans at the beginning of the 1990s fostered 
the development of what were to become well-established 
migration routes across the Sahara, with the main routes towards 
the Moroccan and Libyan coastlines beginning in Agadez, in 
Niger. Travel to Agadez is relatively simple; it can be undertaken 
through scheduled regional bus services, but onwards travel 
through Libya requires help from professional smugglers who 
need to be paid for their services and for the bribes they pay at 
Libyan checkpoints (Malakooti, 2013). Within the West African 
ECOWAS region, citizens can travel quite freely. Consequently, a 
significant proportion of the voyagers intercepted by Maltese and 
Italian search and rescue efforts will have spent several years in 
Libyan and Moroccan towns. Obtaining a place on a boat is 
expensive and whatever their intentions are, migrants often need 
to accumulate savings by working en route to their final 
destination. In general, sea-based crossings are more costly than 
overland routes to Europe and tend to attract migrants who can 
draw upon larger savings. As with other categories of irregular 
migrants, the investment their journeys require tends to mean that 
among these refugees who finally reach Europe, there is a high 
proportion of people who are comparatively well educated and 
may have originally been relatively well off (De Haas, 2008, p. 
1308). The Eritreans and Somalis who travel via Libya have often 
spent time in refugee camps in or around Khartoum after leaving 
their countries (Malakooti, 2013).   
 
What about the Sudanese refugees? Fieldwork among the 
Sudanese refugee community in Cairo conducted in 2011 
suggested that a high proportion had fled areas affected by civil 
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warfare with a quarter of the sample interviewed by the 
fieldworkers being Darfurians and slightly smaller proportions 
coming from what was then southern Sudan as well as South 
Kordofan (Jacobsen, 2014, p. 7). Darfurians and South Kordofans 
made up the largest proportions encountered by researchers in 
Libya in 2013 (Radio Dabanga, 1 Sep 2013). Sudanese used to 
enjoy dual nationality rights in Egypt and northwards migration 
from Sudan to Cairo is historically routine; for this reason, many 
of the Sudanese who attempt the Mediterranean crossing from 
Libya have spent prior periods in refugees’ settlements in Egypt. 
 
 
Source: Schmitz, 2013 
 
 
III. The Push Factors That Drive Refugee and Other Migrant 
Flows Across the Mediterranean  
 
The refugees that originate from North Eastern African 
countries are people who have been affected either by 
exceptionally repressive governments or by conflicts in which 
governments are unable to restore or maintain order and security. 
Most migrants of Eritrean, Sudanese and many of Somali origin 
who depart to Europe by sea from Libya conform with traditional 
conceptions of refugees. Research in 2006, among migrants from 
these countries in Libya, concurred that mostly their original 
decision to leave their home country was prompted by warfare or 
political repression (Hamood, 2006, pp. 26-29).   
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Eritrea is considered by the UNCHR to be a major refugee-
producing country. A 700,000 strong diaspora of Eritreans settled 
in neighbouring states during its war of liberation from Ethiopia, 
between 1974 and 1993. However, today’s Eritrean refugees are 
not fleeing from hostilities. During the re-ignition of warfare with 
Ethiopia at the time of a border conflict, in 1998-2000, mass 
conscription was introduced. 
 
Large-scale warfare ended in 2000 though there have been 
sporadic border skirmishes since then. However, the government 
has maintained and indeed expanded conscription. All adults 
between the ages of 18 and 49 are subject to national service under 
military discipline. On paper, full time service is meant to last 18 
months but in practice, it is often extended long beyond this 
through compulsory engagement in supposed development 
projects, for which people are paid survival level wages. Some 
tens of thousands of Eritreans are imprisoned for trying to evade 
national service and are held under appalling conditions in fifty 
special prisons where they are treated very harshly. National 
service evaders make up the larger share of refugees, though the 
regime also imprisons adherents of non-recognized churches such 
as Jehovah Witnesses and, more frequently, political critics.  
 
The above-cited research in Libya indicated that most of the 
Eritrean refugees had left after their detention or after escaping 
from detention (Hamood, 2006, p. 27). Amnesty reported in 2013 
that 10,000 people were being held without trial for political 
offences. By 2009, 100,000 new refugees inhabited Sudanese 
encampments and around 900 people were crossing the border into 
Ethiopia every month (Human Rights Watch). Human Rights 
Watch believes that between 1994 and 2014, 200,000 people left 
Eritrea for political reasons, or to evade national service (Human 
Rights Watch, 2014, p. 18). People who are caught while 
attempting to leave are punished severely as are refugees deported 
back to Eritrea by unwilling host governments. For example, 
Malta returned 232 Eritreans in 2002 all of whom were 
subsequently imprisoned and many tortured (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009, p. 72). Since then, Malta has ceased repatriating 
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Eritreans. With collusion from government officials, traffickers in 
Sudan and Egypt this year were reported to be holding Eritreans in 
camps and torturing them as well as forcing them to work while 
holding them until receiving ransom payments from relatives 
(Sherwood, 11 Feb 2014). In general, the treatment of Christian 
Eritrean refugees in North African countries has deteriorated in 
recent years from both officials and the general public; this has 
been especially the case in Egypt and Libya. 
 
It is likely that Sudanese arrivals in Malta and Lampedusa are 
mainly people displaced by warfare, which has disrupted routine 
social life in Darfur in the Western Sudan for the last eleven years. 
The conflict is very complicated in its origins, evolving from 
competition for land and water between Arab pastoralists and 
African cultivators. Tensions over land were accentuated by 
persistent droughts in the late 1980s and by legal changes, which 
eroded the status of local traditional authorities who had 
customarily allocated land. An Arab militia, the Janjaweed, began 
supporting landless nomads who had been invading cultivated 
holdings. African groups, the Fur and Zaghawa, set up village self-
defence groups and sought support from Southern Sudanese rebels 
who had been fighting the Khartoum government from the 
previous decade. After these local militia attacked police posts, the 
government armed the Janjaweed. Full-scale fighting began in 
2003 and despite two peace agreements in 2005 and 2011 violence 
has persisted and continues today. These hostilities are very 
difficult to halt because the adversaries are internally divided and 
operate under very localised and fragmented command structures. 
There was a steep rise in conflict in 2013 because of fighting 
between rival Arab militias. The old connections between the 
Fur/Zaghawa groups and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) continue to be important, as well, in fuelling 
warfare despite the Southern Sudan secession of 2011.  
 
The new Southern Sudan state’s boundaries did not 
accommodate all the participants in the southern rebellion against 
Khartoum and a residual group of SPLM rebels in the Khordofan 
provinces (still in Sudan proper) have bases and support networks 
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in Darfur. Altogether, the Darfur conflict has displaced about two 
million people – a third of the original population. In the last year 
alone, 380,000 were forced to leave their homes. Most of these 
people inhabit encampments within Darfur but there are 300,000 
still in refugee settlements in Chad (with which Darfur shares its 
longest border) and Libya, which over the years has also 
accommodated comparable numbers of refugees. This year, the 
outbreak of warfare between armed forces embodying two of 
Southern Sudan’s major ethnicities is likely to prompt a further 
northwards exodus of refugees. 
 
Somalian migrants in Egypt interviewed in 2006 were less 
likely to cite conflict as the reason for their departure than the 
Sudanese and Eritrean ex-patriates encountered in the same study. 
Many gave reasons that suggest that “the search for a better life” 
was the main consideration; in other words even if they apply for 
asylum, Somalis might more accurately be classified as “economic 
migrants” (Hamood, 2006, p. 28). However, the distinction 
between refugees whose departure is a direct effect of warfare and 
danger and people who seek livelihoods because none are 
available in local settings destroyed by warfare is a fine one. 
Extensive warfare in southern Somalia followed the collapse of 
the Barre dictatorship in 1991 and continued on a wide scale 
between 1991 and 1995. A second phase of extensive fighting 
developed between 2005 and 2012, by which time a sizeable 
proportion of the area at one time or another had been affected by 
hostilities was now at least more or less under the control of an 
African Union backed government in Mogadishu. A broad arc of 
territory around Mogadishu is in fact not under government 
control but is rather administered by a patchwork of Islamist 
militias some of whom play host to the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-
Shabaab. More peaceful than it has been for a decade – despite Al-
Shabaab terrorism – Somalia remains unstable and volatile. Most 
of the productive economy is concentrated in the countryside – 
Somalia’s main exports are livestock and sesame seeds and most 
urban people, especially younger men, are unemployed. 
Somaliland is a self-declared independent republic in the north of 
the territory and an area which has largely been peaceful for the 
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last two decades. Between August and October 2011, around 
3,500 young men left home in Somaliland to travel through 
Ethiopia and Sudan with the intention of making the sea crossing 
from Libya to Europe (IRINnews, 22 Nov 2011; Young, 12 Aug 
2013). 
 
West Africans who attempt to enter Europe across the 
Mediterranean are less likely to have travelled from warfare 
settings or indeed from especially oppressive national 
governments, though of course increases in migrant flows from 
Ivory Coast after 2002 and from Mali more recently are certainly 
partly prompted by the out-break of civil wars in those two 
countries. Research undertaken for the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicates that the largest proportions 
of West African irregular migrants “detected” in Spain, Italy, 
Malta and Greece between 2008 and 2011 are from Senegal (31%) 
and Nigeria (29%) (Bouteillet-Paquet, 2011, p. 26).  In the West 
African region, Senegal stands out for its political tranquillity. On 
the other hand urban joblessness in Dakar and the other principal 
towns has sharply increased in the last decade. This is partly a 
consequence of an escalating urbanisation (Dakar’s population has 
doubled in ten years), which itself is a reflection of growing land-
shortages and the removal of traditional subsidies for peanut 
farmers. Contributing to the number of Senegalese boat people has 
been the sharp contraction of opportunities for legal emigration to 
France.  
 
A sample of Nigerians was surveyed by the UNODC in Nigeria 
who were about to travel to Europe across the Sahara. The survey 
found that 63 per cent were high school graduates and that 13 per 
cent had university degrees. More than half were not poor and had 
livelihoods of some kind or another – as taxi drivers for instance 
or petty traders. Most would be joining family members already 
established in Europe. For them migration was not enforced flight 
but rather “...a conscious choice … to enhance their livelihoods” 
(Bouteillet-Paquet, 2011, p. 26).     
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Both with respect to the Nigerians and the Senegalese, the 
illegal migrants are following well-established trajectories through 
which successive generations have attempted to improve their life 
prospects through responding to cheap labour demands in northern 




IV. Does the Upward Trend of Recent Arrivals in Malta and 
Italy Represent a Long-Term Development that Will 
Result, if Unchecked, in Much Higher Numbers?  
 
Is the flow into Southern Europe of African refugees likely to 
continue to expand? Will it result in much higher numbers of 
illegal sailings from Africa being intercepted by the Italian and 
Maltese authorities as well as the other governments in Southern 
Europe? 
 
As we have noted, there are two main drivers that are pushing 
the flows of irregular migration. On the one hand, there is long 
standing violent conflict as well as the political repression that 
accompanies such conflict: these are concentrated in North East 
Africa. They show no sign of abating in Sudan and the activities of 
the Eritrean government that generate refugee departures remain 
unchecked. Somalia remains volatile and in many areas 
impoverished and insecure. The considerations that prompt people 
from this region to undertake the dangers and risks of voyages 
across the sea to Europe are likely to remain compelling. As are 
the second set of more general drivers of livelihood-enhancing 
emigration, especially from West African settings. In this region 
increasing numbers of increasingly well educated people live in 
cities in which formal employment has remained level for two 
decades or has actually diminished. 
 
That does not necessarily mean that the boat traffic to Malta, 
Italy and other Mediterranean destinations will expand. European 
efforts to “sub-contract” the task of regulating and confining 
migrant flows to North African administrations have been 
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effective in Morocco and Tunisia and cut sharply the sea-borne 
smuggling from Libya in 2010, though the subsequent war and 
ensuing administrative collapse disrupted Libyan controls. Italian 
policy has been to link development aid to commitments by North 
African countries to readmit failed asylum seekers deported from 
Europe (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006, p. 320). The Libyan controls 
will certainly be re-established, though, once effective 
bureaucracy is restored.   
 
Would this be a good thing? I am not so sure. Such controls as 
are sought from North African governments by the EU  hardly 
represent a humane outcome and indeed they have prompted 
North African officials and politicians to mistreat refugees, in so 
doing abandoning well established Islamic conventions of 
accommodation and solidarity (Marcelino and Farahi, 2011, pp. 
884-885). Excluding refugees from conflict safe havens is a 
violation of both moral and legal conventions, and in effect the 
harsh extension of controls on irregular migrant movements 
through North Africa make refugees and other migrants all the 
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